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fication of an abridgement of a contract. 18 Congress has always deter-
mined the policy, which must not be confused with the judicial right
to determine power.19
The wording of the bonds, while perfectly legal at the time they
were written, show that the makers intended to prevent loss if Con-
gress altered the value of gold. The Court, in the instant case, has
seen through the subterfuge and extended its ruling in the Gold
Clause cases to cover optional bonds and thus defeating the obvious at-
tempt to nullify the Gold Clause Acts. The Court points to the Senate
report on the Resolution which shows the intention of Congress to
prevent such a result.20 The Courts, having previously recognized
the Congressional power in relation to the United States monetary
policy, 21 were consistent in affirming the decision of the lower courts.
Gold coin is no longer recognized as legal tender and the obligation of
the contract to pay money is governed by that which the law shall
recognize as money.22 The Joint Resolution and subsequent legisla-
tion stated what was to be recognized as legal tender for all domestic
obligations. The bonds and mortgages in the instant case were found
to be domestic obligations that came within the law.
23
R. M. P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-MuLTIPLE INHERITANCE TAXATION-
DETERMINATION OF DOMICILE BY SUPREME CouRT.-This action, in
the nature of a bill of interpleader, was brought in the Supreme Court
by the State of Texas against the states of Florida, New York and
Massachusetts, to determine the domicile of the decedent, Edward H.
R. Green, who died leaving an estate which included intangibles ag-
gregating more than $35,000,000. The court's jurisdiction was based
on allegations that each state claimed to be deceased's domicile for
taxing purposes, and that the total sum of the claims of each state
and the Federal Government would far exceed the total value of the
estate, thereby jeopardizing plaintiff's attempt to collect its taxes.
The court appointed a special master,' who found that decedent, at
Is Wollf Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522,
43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923).19 Chicago, B. & 0. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 259
(1911).
20 SEN. REP. No. 99, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) ("Additional and imme-
diate legislation is necessary to remove the disturbing effect of this uncertainty
and to insure the success of the policy by closing possible legal loopholes and
removing inconsistencies").
21 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1871).
22 Faw v. Marstitler, 2 Cranch 1, 29, 32 (U. S. 1804).
23 See notes 6, 7, supra.
1301 U. S. 671, 57 Sup. Ct. 935 (1936).
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time of his death, was domiciled in Massachusetts. On appeal from
the Special Master's report, held, one judge dissenting, report con-
firmed. A justiciable case is presented as there was a real risk that
the state lawfully entitled to the tax would be unable to collect it if
the other states also collected their taxes, and as it was a controversy
among states, it was within the equity jurisdiction of the court to pre-
vent the threatened loss. The evidence supported the finding of domi-
cile in Massachusetts. 2 Texas v. Florida, et al., 306 U. S. 398, 59
Sup. Ct. 563 (1939).
Original jurisdiction over interstate controversies was granted to
the Supreme Court by the Constitution 3 and made exclusive by the
Judiciary Articles. 4 As with suits between individuals, the court has
jurisdiction only if an actual "case" or "controversy" exists.5 Al-
though the present Federal Interpleader Act 6 does not specifically
mention suits to which states are parties, the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court includes interpleader actions wherever such relief
is found to be justified according to the accepted doctrines of equity
jurisprudence. 7  Although plaintiff need not await actual institution
of independent suits, it must be shown, however, that conflicting
2 Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissents, stating that the court should not set a
precedent in assuming jurisdiction in disputes over domicile, especially as the
"single-state domicile" doctrine is outmoded, and as there is no real threat of
loss to Texas.
3 U. S. CoNsr. Art. III, § 2.
4 1 STAT. 80 (1787), 28 U. S. C. § 341 (1934).
5 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 251 (1899); Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 22 Sup. Ct. 552 (1902); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258
U. S. 574, 42 Sup. Ct. 406 (1922); United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S.
463, 470, 55 Sup. Ct. 789 (1934).
649 STAT. 1096 (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(26) (Supp. 1938). Following
its passage in 1936 it was thought that this new interpleader act might serve as
the solution to the problem of multiple inheritance taxation, for it would afford
a means by which an executor could interplead the tax officials of contending
states and thereby obtain a determination of domicile binding on all the involved
states. However, in Worchester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292,
58 Sup. Ct. 185 (1937), the court held that such an action by an executor
against a state taxing official is in reality an action by an individual against the
state and, therefore, forbidden by the 11th Amendment. For a more complete
discussion see Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of J936 (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. 1161.
7 See Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 222 (U. S. 1818) ; Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 460, 462 (U. S. 1855) ; Irvine v.
Marshall, 20 How. 558, 564 (U. S. 1857); Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430(U. S. 1868). Originally courts of equity entertained only strict bills of inter-
pleader wherein the plaintiff was merely a disinterested stakeholder, but later
equity extended its jurisdiction to permit bills in the nature of interpleader in
which the plaintiff claims an interest in the property or funds, and the court is
asked to guard against the consequent depletion of the funds at the expense of
plaintiff's interest therein, and to protect him and other parties from the prosecu-
tion of numerous demands to only one of which the fund is subject. See Pacific
National Bank v. Mixter, 124 U. S. 721, 8 Sup. Ct. 718 (1887); Providence
Say. Life Assurance Soc. v. Loeb, 115 Fed. 357 (C. C. D. La. 1901) ; 2 SroiY,
EQuIrY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) § 1140; MACLENNAN, THE LAW OF
INTERPLEADER (1901) 338-343.
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claims are asserted, and that there is an actual risk of substantial
losses.
In the instant case, the majority of the court found that there
was a real and substantial risk that losses might result from the in-
dependent prosecution of rival, but mutually exclusive claims,8 and
as the action was prosecuted between states which were the rival
claimants, it spelled out a justiciable "case" or "controversy" and
came within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.9 The
majority of the court bases this reasoning on the assumption that
the highest courts of all four states would have found the decedent
to have been domiciled in their state, and, therefore, all would have
taxed the estate. But if only one state did not levy any tax, the
estate would be large enough to meet the taxes imposed by the three
other states and the Federal Government. As pointed out by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion, the probabilities of the
high courts of all four states finding domicile--even if possibly influ-
enced by financial benefits to their own states-seem very remote
both from adjudicated experience' 0 and the special circumstances of
this case. 1
Another ground upon which the court could have found a jus-
ticiable case 12 would have been on the theory that if the right of a
state of domicile to tax the transfer of decedent's intangibles is a
sovereign right, then the taxation by a non-domiciliary state would
be an infringement on that sovereignty, 1 resulting in damage com-
parable to that in a boundary dispute when one state exercises police
power over territory rightfully belonging to another, and therefore
within the original jurisdiction of the court. This reasoning is, how-
ever, based on the old rule of a person having only a single domicile
for taxing purpose, and it is at least debatable whether that doctrine
still is the rule. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent raises strong
doubts as to the applicability of the old common law rule of "one
man-one home" in our modern business systems, 14 and recent de-
s The Special Master found that decedent's intangibles at the time of his
d&.th had a value of $35,831,303, while the aggregate of the taxes which would
be due to the United States and due to each state, if its contentions were sus-
tained, amounted to $37,727,213, exceeding the total net estate by the sum of
$1,589,877.
9 See Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 261, 53 Sup. Ct.
345, 351 (1932).10 Matter of Trowbridge, 266 N. Y. 283, 194 N. E. 756 (1935) (in which
New York courts held that Connecticut was entitled to tax decedent's estate as
the true state of domicile).
11 The master states that Texas and Florida had little to support their
claims of domicile, while New York denies in its brief, without contradiction,
that its procedure for tax levy and collection had been set in operation.
12 See (1937) -46 YALE L. J. 1235, 1238.
13 Following the principle of mobilia sequunter personaim doctrine stated in
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1929),
and Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1929).14 Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 428, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 578 (1939).
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cisions 15 make it seem probable that our courts are attempting to
turn away from that doctrine.
Consideration of policy may be advanced both for and against
the acceptance of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in this case.
This court seems an inappropriate forum to litigate such a matter
as domicile, and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction should be exercised
only when absolutely necessary and when the case is in itself abso-
lutely justiciable. 16 However, under our system of jurisprudence
the Supreme Court must apparently be the final arbiter if two state
courts reach conflicting decisions, and the court can and will pro-
tect itself against feigned controversies. In the principal case, Mr.
Justice Stone in writing the court's opinion is careful to point out
the exceptional circumstances of this case and the fact that the court
was taking jurisdiction only because of the possibility that the total
taxes might exceed the value of the estate. However, in view of the
straining of the court to find a justiciable case in this action, it is
extremely probable that even in cases presenting different circum-
stances, the court would attempt to acquire jurisdiction so as to de-
termine the domicile-unless, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests, it
abandons entirely the single-state domicile doctrine.
A.A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT-THE RIGHT
TO BEAR ARMs.-Defendants were indicted for transporting in inter-
state commerce, a certain firearm subject to registration and taxation
under the National Firearms Act,' without having complied with the
provisions of the Act.2 On appeal by the United States from a judg-
ment sustaining the demurrer, held, reversed. The Act in question is
not unconstitutional since it does not interfere with the right of the
people to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amend-
ment 3 nor does it usurp the police power reserved to the states.
4
United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 59 Sup. Ct. 817 (1939).
15 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 350, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939) ; Graves et al.
v. Elliott et al., 302 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939); see (1939) 14 ST.
JoEN's L. R~v. 195.
16 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 15, 20 Sup. Ct. 251 (1900).
148 STAT. 1236, 26 U. S. C. §§ 1132-1132q (1934) ("An Act to provide for
the taxation of manufacturers, importers and dealers in certain firearms and
machine guns, to tax the sale or other disposal of such weapons, and to restrict
importation and regulate interstate commerce thereof").
2Id. at 1239, 26 U. S. C. § 1132j (1934) ("It shall be unlawful for any
person who is required to register * * * or has not in his possession a stamp-
affixed order * * * to ship, carry or deliver any firearm i interstate com-
merce").
3 U. S. CoNsT. Amend. II (" *** the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed").
4 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 57 Sup. Ct. 554 (1937).
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